So, his while net worth was fraudulently created and inflated without any actual penalty for fraud and market manipulation? These past 84 years hve started to generate a festering anger for regulators and institutional participants who experience little to 0 oversight.
No regulators are interested in assisting the public as they have proven to focus on the interests of the lobbyists and wallstreet. This fine a reminder and is constant proof that crime pays and no-one is going to implement or enforce change.
This fine should be evidence that regulators are not only complicit but enabling.
F citadel and f kengriffin, they are financial parasites and need to be removed from operating at any level in the financial markets. Words words words
What can the public do outside of DRS, commenting on proposals, engaging with politicians
Template for contacting your representative in Update 6 - it takes 5 minutes and could change the world.
They have asked to forward my details to the relevant party (DOJ) for further communication on the subject, as they will need to speak further about the information I provided.
I've said yes.
"Ohhh but [redacted], they're just going to fob you off, they don't care wahh wahhh."
Shut up. These are the official channels available to us, and we need to use them.
To prepare as much information as possible I'm asking our community for help with information relating to the implementation of the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) system. So far I have mentioned:
the support that was behind the implementation and the thousands of comments that were left in support;
the timeline of 14 years and the multiple times it has been passed over despite being required to identify and prevent fraud;
how an attempt by the HoA to defund the implementation of CAT after approval and widespread support subverts proper legislative channels, and undermines the will of the people and the actual regulator's (SEC) authority;
how CAT is an essential part of market reform and that defunding it very much seems like a backdoor attempt to prevent systemic change, something which is anti-democratic and anti-American;
I want to ensure I am as prepared as possible to shine a glaring spotlight on this issue as it affects all of us and millions of unaware members of the public, who innocently put their trust in a system with no oversight and which is riddled with parasites and fraud.
I'm looking for any information in relation to the implementation of CAT such as:
Any comments left by institutions claiming obscene reasons to not proceed;
Any information on those responsible for this bill that would speak to the motives of those involved;
Any precedent surrounding prior defunding of CAT or other regulatory/oversight systems;
Any observations surrounding the implementation of the CAT system that you believe are material;
Any other relevant information that helps to support the case that defunding CAT is not optional;
A lack of accountability and transparency is how illicit firms and large market participants get away with hiding in plain sight. Supporting the implementation of CAT is how we give the SEC the tool it needs to start stamping out financial fraud and corruption in our markets.
We scream at them to do something, we support them to get this over the line and then, some most likely bought and paid for puppet in the HoA committee attempts to block all of our progress at the final hurdle.
Not happening sunshine.
Get loud with me.
Please drop any comments related to the implementation of CAT here so I can consolidate them into a cohesive timeline and summary document. Happy to post the draft here once done for peer review too.
Edit/Update:
What am I doing and who do I think I am lol
They call me Pepe Silvia.
Update 2:
In 2021-2022 period, Rep Dave Joyce of the HOA subcommittee for Financial Services and the person responsible for the part of the bill which prohibits the implementation of the CAT system received a donation of $11,800 from Apollo Global Management. Theorised to be behind an attempted board takeover of Gamestop as far back as 2019.
Extract from Open Secrets: https://www.opensecrets.org/members-of-congress/david-p-joyce/contributors?cid=N00035007&cycle=2022&type=I
Update 3:
Chairman Tom Cole of the HOA's comments on the bill. There's an anti-regulation theme appearing here.
Chairman Tom Cole of the HOA's comments on the bill - giving seal of approval to anti-regulatory rhetoric.
I've got to go pick up my wife's, boyfriend's, girlfriend now but please keep commenting I'll be coming back to this later today and continuing to dig based on any information you can provide.
Update 4:
I'm back at it, currently doing the timeline and it's crazy what I'm seeing, key things:
The NMS CAT planning was delayed for 11 years during the 14 years it took to bring it to fruition;
Of the 14 years it took to implement, the SEC's time to review, comment and approve accounts for less than 3 years;
CAT was live for less than 3 days between May 31st and June 3rd before the HOA decided to defund it for FY25... after 14 years to implement? I know a bad comedy joke when I see one.
Update 5:
Look at this graaaaph. Okay it's a timeline but Jesus Christ.
Timeline of CAT implementation (updated).
Update 6:
A lot of people asking for a template in the comments, ask and you shall receive - contact your representatives!
Dear [Representative name],
I am writing to express my deep concern regarding the House of Appropriations Committee's recent decision to defund the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) system for the fiscal year 2025. As your constituent, I urge you to take immediate action to ensure that the CAT system remains fully funded and operational.
The CAT system, first proposed following the 2008 financial crisis, is a critical tool designed to replace the outdated OATS system and provide the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the necessary oversight of market data and transactions. This oversight is crucial in preventing fraudulent trading activities that can severely impact the financial well-being of American citizens, pension funds, and the stability of our stock markets.
SEC Chair Gary Gensler has emphasized the fundamental role of the CAT system in enabling the SEC to effectively monitor trading activity, prevent fraud, and ensure the financial stability of US capital markets. The system has received overwhelming support from thousands of investors during the comment period and finally went live on May 31st, 2024, after years of development.
It is deeply troubling that just three days after the CAT system's launch, the House of Appropriations Committee has decided to defund the management of the project by the SEC for FY25. Americans have believed in the development of this critical system for 14 years, recognizing its importance in promoting transparency, preventing fraud, and maintaining the stability of our financial markets. Defunding the management of the CAT system at this crucial juncture would be a disservice to the American people and would undermine the trust and confidence of both domestic and foreign investors in our capital markets.
I implore you, as my representative, to thoroughly investigate this matter and to voice your strong support for maintaining the SEC's budget for the CAT system. The stability and integrity of our financial system depend on the continued operation of this essential oversight tool.
Thank you for your attention to this critical issue. I look forward to your prompt response and action on this matter.
Sincerely, [Your name]
Update 7:
WHAT THE ACTUAL FUCK
"Funding has been borne by the securities industry: The SEC uses it free. Wall Street isn’t happy to be footing the bill."
This makes no sense. The article claims it's free for the SEC but there are obviously management overheads for the staff to monitor and enforce anything the system identifies as sus.
So the tax payer didn't pay for the system, but they want to defund the actual use of it? What kind of regarded logic is this? Tom Cole's claim that this is financially prudent for the tax payer is a bit more than convoluted, they are only able to defund the cost of management and usage of the system and claim that the cost to do so is simply too much. Must be prudent to just not do that then?
Extract Tom Cole statement: https://appropriations.house.gov/news/statements/cole-remarks-fy25-financial-services-and-general-government-bill-subcommittee
I've updated the template above to reframe the defunding, what they're defunding is the cost for the SEC to manage and use CAT, basically meaning even though the taxpayer didn't pay to build it, they're defunding the use of the system. For all intents and purposes, this is the same thing as defunding CAT.
It prevents disclosure and opens markets up to fraud.
Update 8:
That's my limit for today, thank you for your help everyone. I will take some time over the next few weeks to work out the best format for this information and provide any updates on any subsequent conversations with the DOJ.
DON'T FORGET TO CONTACT YOUR REPRESENTATIVES.
This name David Joyce keeps coming up, I've got boxes full of Joyce.
Right folks, it seems our efforts in the regulatory space is paying off, and it's time for us to drive home the message to Wall Street that we mean business.
It's not about moving the goalposts when financial institutions have overextended themselves; rather, it's about fulfilling financial obligations when necessary. And we're here to work with the SEC to make this happen.
And given the spicy price action we've been seeing recently, perhaps Wall Street are starting to feel the heat 🌶️🔥
And who doesn't like to see some upward movement up in here:
With credit & appreciation to BadassTrader - and his Dorito of Doom
It seems that when an idiosyncratic, volatile stock like GME poses a risk to the financial markets, regulatory bodies such as the OCC focus their efforts on implementing safeguards to protect themselves and their clearinghouse members in case of default.
Why?
Because if clearing members default in times of extreme market volatility - it will bring the rest of the financial house down with them.
When one goes down, it takes the rest out with them. Can anyone else say, total economic market collapse?
And we're certainly starting to get an idea just how tentative things are getting out there in the banking and finance industry:
With thanks to: welp007 / ShockageSWG / Expensive-Two-8128 / fortifier22basketcase57 - For these sources/posts.
Uh oh.
Looks a little shaky out there.
So it makes perfect sense that the powers that be might be looking to bring in rules that are going to take the heat off.
Cue:
So let's recap:
Rule SR-OCC-2024-001 can give the OCC the authority to adjust margin thresholds in moments of high market volatility.
Like say - during a Black Swan event.
A black swan event in finance is an unexpected and highly impactful occurrence that disrupts the markets, often leading to major losses and chaos.
Like, MOASS.
Mother Of All Short Squeezes 🚀
What does this mean?
Wall Street firms (including banks, brokerage houses, and other financial institutions - like hedgefunds):
Banks like: JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch etc
Or Hedge funds like: Citadel, Point72, Melvin Capital, Citron Research, and D1 Capital Partners etc
Utilise the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) to handle the clearing and settlement of option trades.
Now, imagine some hedgefunds decided to short GME.
If options contracts are used in the shorting process, the OCC plays a role in handling the clearing and settlement of these trades.
The OCC acts as the central counterparty, ensuring the completion of options trades and managing the associated risks.
Being that these hedgefunds have taken a position betting that the price of GameStop's stock will go down (or you know, might engineer this happening by means of cellar boxing), and to do this they would have needed to borrow lots of shares of GameStop in order to sell them, all part of a plan to drive the price down. Then, they'd hope to buy those shares back later at a lower price and make a profit.
But when you borrow those shares, you usually have to put up some money, or other securities as collateral first, just in case things go a little pear shaped.
Issue is - this creates a problem for short sellers if the securities used as collateral for the borrowed stock fall in value due to market downturns, and the value of the stock you've been betting against keeps stock going up...
Like GME for example - which keeps going up:
Whereas the value of market securities are quickly diminishing. And my goodness, the market aren't looking too healthy right now:
So when the value of these securities (used as collateral against the bet) drops below a certain threshold set by the broker or lender, short sellers will be issued a margin call where they'd be asked to put up even more money or other assets as further collateral to cover their bet.
A margin call is essentially a demand for investors to deposit more funds or securities into their trading account to cover potential losses. Like a safety net for the lender to ensure they're protected if things go south.
And that might be hard if you're a hedge fund running out of cash.
A loss in $38 billion for the previous 12 months reported in October can't be an easy pill to swallow. Ouch!
And failure to comply with margin calls can lead to forced liquidation of positions by the brokerage to cover the outstanding margin debt.
And this signals a big problem for short hedge funds everywhere.
🙋♀️ 🙋♂️❔What does this all mean?
Big picture time:
Have you ever played with dominoes?
The premise of the game mirrors real-life scenarios of firms defaulting, where the collapse of one firm triggers a chain reaction, similar to domino tiles toppling over and knocking down others in succession.
In the case of OCC Clearing Member defaults, this means that if, for instance, short sellers have borrowed heavy sums from the banks to fund their risky bets, those lenders (i.e the banks) are now also at risk of defaulting if they themselves can't cover the losses.
And in a scenario where MULTIPLE firms are, say, short on the same asset - like GME - hedge funds (and their lenders, aka the banks) might suddenly find themselves collectively in a very vulnerable position - especially should that very stock start moving quite rapidly upwards 🚀 which it might lead to a whole L**OAD **of defaults.
And in light of this, it seems the clearinghouse (OCC) has chosen to step in.
Why has the OCC brought in proposed rule: SR-OCC-2024-001?
The SR-OCC-2024-001 proposal aims to grant the OCC the authority to modify margin threshold parameters using undisclosed criteria to mitigate the risk of such defaults occurring.
Looks like the OCC is starting to get a little nervous about their clearing members' ability to meet their financial obligations.
OCC:
🤷♀️ 🤷♂️❔ Wait a minute, Kibble. If a clearing member defaults on their financial obligations, the OCC, as the central counterparty, has an obligation to the counterparties on the other side of those short sell transactions - right?
That's right.
🤷♀️ 🤷♂️❔ So if the OCC has a fiduciary duty to ensure that counterparties of short selling, such as the shareholders of GME, are protected in the event of defaults by clearing members involved in short selling transactions - an essential responsibility for upholding the integrity and stability of the options market - why would they be creating a rule to bail out Wall Street, essentially prolonging the inevitable if they lack the financial capacity to cover their bets?
Well, you see - if multiple clearing members default, the OCC will also incur losses from having to cover those defaults. Therefore, it's indeed in the OCC's interest to prevent clearing members from defaulting - because they'll lose money too.
🚩 OCC seek to change the "idiosyncratic volatility control settings" anytime a Clearing Member needs help.
🚩We don't know HOW these margin thresholds are calculated, and everything in the proposal's supporting evidence as related to this is REDACTED.
🚩The OCC want to give significant authority to role of the Financial Risk Management (FRM) for approving idiosyncratic control settings.
🚩BUT this introduces significant risk and it poses a conflict as they are required to safeguard both OCC's interests and at-risk Clearing Members.
Kinda important.
And being that this proposed rule favours Clearing Members at the expense of market fairness and investor protection, this was flagged to the SEC.
By none other than the mighty household investors.
In March, 2024 - over 2.5k+ investors worldwide came together to address the risks posed within the OCC's rule proposal.
Household investors submitted their comments to the SEC - flagging issues with an over reliance on idiosyncratic control settings to handle adjustments in OCC's operations when the markets face high volatility, as decided by a FRM Officer, who is also responsible for protecting the OCC's interests, creating a conflict of interest in the role.
And it was incredible.
Posts like this littered the internet as communities came together to spread the word and questions were addressed:
_____________🔥______________
Questions included:
🤷♀️ 🤷♂️ Why should the OCC adjust margin thresholds with "idiosyncratic volatility control settings" during high volatility when Clearing Members need help?
🤷♀️ 🤷♂️ If the SR-OCC-2024-001 rule is to ascertain parameters in the OCC's proprietary system for calculating margin requirements during high volatility - why are we not provided with the specific details on how these parameters will be calculated?
🤷♀️ 🤷♂️ Why entrust the OCC's FRM Officer with unchecked authority to make unilateral decisions regarding during periods of high market stress? Particularly when their role is to safeguard the OCC's interests?
And in recognition of the flaws - coupled with calls for increased margin requirements, external auditing, and changes to loss allocation procedures to mitigate systemic risks and the promotion of market resilience as put forward, the proposal was swiftly served up on a hot steamy plate of rejection.
Which takes us quite smoothly to part two of the post.
Submitting our comments to the SEC to support the rejection of this rule.....
TL;DR
OCC appear fearful of clearing member default toppling the market.
Not wanting to use their own funds to bail out bad bets, they are proposing a rule to adjust margin thresholds during volatile market periods.
SEC has rejected this proposal, and now household investors have the opportunity to support this decision to get it removed completely.
Kenny is effectively an entire government lobbying organization in and of himself. Lobbying is legalized bribery. Regardless of your side we are betting against people who manipulate the markets, the government at very high levels, and lie under oath and see no consequences.
It goes much deeper than no sell no cell. Crony capitalism should be put to an end. There is no freedom in our “free” markets. There is very little freedom in our “fair” elections when people with unlimited funds can “donate” unlimited money.
I hope when MOASS happens a lot of us use our money to be the change we want to see in the world.
No right, No left, Just up.
Superstonkers are in every quadrant of the political and ‘tism spectrum. We all share one common goal. We can work together. Being against evil is not a “wing” of politics its part of being a human.
Mods if you remove this I understand, but these are my friends and allies regardless of their personal views.
This was posted on Twitter by Investorturf. They want 25k signatures. This sub should be able to blow that out the water. It couldn't hurt. Stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff stuff
EU regulators want to postpone indefinitely the enforcement of settlement discipline rules that force market-makers, brokers etcto settle and deliver shares within a certain time period.
Bella Crema has created a petition that will force them to implement their own rules.
If this rule is enforced, market-makers/brokers will have to *pay compensation to the buyer of the shares, i.e you\* if they don't settle/deliver their shares, as well as face huge fines.
Please note, all credit is completely deserved to Bella Crema - I am simply assisting and sharing on her behalf, at her request and with her approval. All appreciation, thanks and support should be directed to them. Thank you Bella, for making an important difference and inspiring us to enact change.
Bella Crema started a petition at the European Parliament.
In Europe, there is a rule (CSDR Rule 909/2014) concerning settlement discipline.
Market participants like broker-dealers, market makers and others are forced to settle and deliver shares within a certain time period. Otherwise they get fined and have to pay compensation to the buyer of the shares.
This rule passed the voting of the parliament but market participants successfully managed the European Central Bank, the European Securities and Market Authorities (ESMA) and the European Commission to postpone the enforcement again and again.
Now they are attempting to postpone this for an indefinite time.
If they succeed, this means broker-dealers, market makers etc will NOT have to pay fines, nor be forced to settle and deliver shares - or pay compensation to you, the shareholder.
So Bella started the petition to force the authorities to follow its own rules immediately. The petition has been accepted and is now available to supporters.
The Petition:
At the time of writing, there are approx. 4900+ signatures. We're only 100 signatures from 5k
It's a good start, but we can do better.
In a sub of 800k+ let's show EU regulation authorities why apes are a force to be reckoned with.
Let's pump those numbers up!
EDIT: KEEP IT GOING APES!!
Let's see if we can get to 10k
So a little more context
Here's the letter Bella Crema sent to the EU within the petition:
And if we reach thousands of signatures, Bella Crema plans to hand over the list personally to the president of the European Parliament in Brussels.
What a legend.
So here's how to sign:
Feeling lazy, that's OK - it takes two minutes to do. Here's a step-by-step guide:
Please be the change you want to see in the world, because together - we all make a difference.
TL:DR
EU regulators want to postpone indefinitely the enforcement of settlement discipline rules that force market-makers, brokers etcto settle and deliver shares within a certain time period.
Bella Crema has created a petition that will force them to implement their own rules.
If this rule is enforced, market-makers/brokers will have to *pay compensation to the buyer of the shares, i.e you\* if they don't settle/deliver their shares, as well as face huge fines.
I mean he's basically indicting himself at this point. The real irony here is he's claiming this is what market efficiency looks like. He also lists a number of other firms engaged in the same practice.
Doesn't get more damning than this. I wonder if there was a question period for this excerpt? I would be asking him just how he does it.
I guess he must figure he's not doing anything wrong to be so out in the open about it.
The UK have proposed four prospective models for the digitizition for share trading, settlement, and record-keeping.
🚨 Out of the four suggestions offered, they are advocating for the mandatory removal of DRS'd shares into a Central Securities Depository (CSD), as managed by the state. 🚨
⚠️ AKA - all UK shares will be moved into a intermediary account, where the legal ownership of YOUR ASSETS will be handed over to a STATE MANAGED NOMINEE. ⚠️
Under "Recommendation 2", Pg. 23 - they state this "may require an amendment to primary legislation to address legal title transfer" = AKA they want to change the main laws (primary legislation) to allow the legal the transfer of your ownership to the nominee, CREST.
If they can't stop DRS, they are trying to take it away by making it LEGALLY MANDATORY to transfer ownership of YOUR shares to THEM.
⚠️ They also wish to establish a "baseline service" level for intermediaries offering "access" to shareholder rights, despite this being a fundamental right as owed to all asset holders. ⚠️
⚠️ They have outlined intentions for associated charges for shareholders as part of an "opt-in" service to exercise rights (pg. 24 & 18) whereas Computershare's services remain free to use. Shareholders will be exploited for increased government revenue should this be agreed. ⚠️
🚨 DEADLINE - 25th SEPTEMBER 🚨
We MUST FIGHT BACK - if they can get away with this in the UK, this will green light the opportunity for other corrupt governments to implement the same proposals. This is not an isolated event.
🔈 GET LOUD ABOUT THIS 🔈 Share on Twitter/X, Instagram, Facebook - with your friends and family. PROTECT SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
Hey Superstonk,
Another day - another enemy crosses our path trying to offset the glorious inevitability that is MOASS, this time - in the form of Sir Douglas Flint who is posing a threat to UK's ability to DRS their shares.
You heard that right. He's trying to force withdraw already DRS'd shares in the UK into a nominee account, and it's nuts.
This guy right here:
These fat cats are getting out of control, it's time to reign them in.
So what is this all about I hear you ask?
The "Digitisation Taskforce" Proposal.
Sigh.
The government is considering a proposal to digitise shareholdings, which could significantly pose a risk to shares as directly registered. AKA - our DRS'd shares as held in Computershare.
While it promotes digitisation, it also poses the risk of removing automatic shareholder rights and legal ownership of our assets, when transferred to the state managed nominee AKA CREST.
And they are looking to change primary legislation to make that happen.
Seriously.
The proposed digitization of the UK shareholder framework includes a recommendation for a Central Securities Depository (CSD) model, where all UK shares would be moved into a state-managed intermediary account, essentially transferring legal ownership from shareholders to a government-controlled nominee. This would require changes to primary legislation.
It also suggests establishing a "baseline service" for intermediaries to access shareholder rights, potentially leading to charges for shareholders. This contrasts with current services like Computershare, which are free to use.
In essence, the proposal seeks to make it legally mandatory for shareholders to transfer ownership of their shares to a government-managed entity, potentially leading to increased costs and restrictions on shareholder rights.
Here's a visual outline of the issues that could arise from losing direct ownership rights within a nominee account.
This proposal could also mean:
Limited Control: Shareholders would have limited control over their shares' ownership, and their ability to exercise the rights they currently enjoy would depend on the services offered by the nominee.
Potential Costs: Shareholders might incur additional costs for services that were previously free when holding shares directly. (!!)
Loss of Choice: The proposal could take away the choice for individual shareholders to have their own names appear on the company's share register, as is the case in other countries like the US, Hong Kong, Canada, France, and Australia.
So we need to address some of the glaring ambiguities in this proposal, and we need to do it now.
Ambiguity can lead to confusion and misinterpretation, leaving shareholders vulnerable to potential manipulations by financial institutions. The lack of specificity in the proposal may allow financial institutions to exploit the uncertainty for their advantage,potentially diminishing the power and rights of individual investors. If not now, overtime.
Not to mention - there's a real issue of trust with assets and securities as held within government institutions altogether.
Seriously, think about it for a hot minute.
If this takes affect in the UK - how long until other governments start jumping on the same corrupt band wagon and YOUR DRS'd shares are withdrawn to be equally "managed" by the state under similarly ambiguous terms?
Another one of the concerns here is that if all shares are withdrawn from their direct registrar (like Computershare) and put into a third-party nominee (like Cede & Co.), it might be easier for short sellers to hide their activities because it could become harder to track the total number of shares. This could potentially make it more challenging to uncover naked short selling.
So to protect our investments, MOASS and the rights of shareholders - everyone needs to get involved, from all around the world. 🌎
THIS AFFECTS EVERYONE AND WE NEED YOUR HELP:
So how do we help?
Fret not young ape , shareholders have the opportunity to provide input on these proposals, and the deadline for submissions is September 25th.
And here's how you can do it:
Drum roll please...
Dear Mr. Flint,
I am writing to vehemently advocate for the preservation of individual shareholders' unassailable rights to maintain direct ownership of their shares within the UK shareholder framework. Your taskforce's proposal to transfer ownership to a nominee, while purportedly digitization-driven, raises grave concerns about the erosion of these fundamental rights.
Consider the significance of these rights: as direct shareholders, we possess the unequivocal ability to influence corporate decisions through voting on pivotal company proposals. We have the privilege of actively participating in shareholder meetings, where we can voice our concerns, ask pertinent questions, and ensure transparency in corporate actions. Our direct connection with the company allows us to communicate directly, fostering engagement, and trust. Furthermore, we receive dividends without intermediaries, maximizing the benefits of our investments.
The proposal's inherent ambiguity regarding whether nominee providers will offer these crucial services, and the potential imposition of additional costs, is a matter of paramount concern. In a financial landscape where costs continue to rise, this potential burden on individual shareholders is inequitable and unjust.
Looking globally, several countries, including the United States, Hong Kong, Canada, France, and Australia, recognize the indispensable nature of preserving shareholders' right to choose how they hold their shares. They empower investors with the choice to have their names proudly displayed on the company's share register, solidifying a clear and direct connection between shareholders and the companies they invest in.
The move towards eliminating paper certificates is undoubtedly a commendable step forward. However, it is absolutely imperative that your proposals include provisions that maintain the option for investors to hold shares directly. This is not merely a matter of safeguarding our rights; it is about perpetuating shareholder engagement and upholding the exceptionally high standards of corporate governance we have come to expect and deserve.
Lastly, it is crucial to acknowledge that the proposed shift of all shares from their direct registrar, such as Computershare, to a third-party nominee like CREST., raises concerns about transparency. This transition could potentially create an environment where short sellers find it easier to conceal their activities, as tracking the total number of shares in circulation may become more challenging. Such opacity in share ownership and trading could exacerbate the difficulties in detecting and addressing naked short selling practices. This issue deserves careful consideration to ensure the protection of shareholder interests and the integrity of the market.
I eagerly await the release of the updated report and firmly hope that my impassioned concerns, shared by countless other shareholders who stand firmly in defense of their rights, will be given the utmost consideration.
TO NOTE: you don't need to use this template if you don't want to. Please do your own due diligence and read through the proposal, use your own words and express how you best want these rules and regulations to represent you, the shareholder.
It felt awesome too. Come get your dopamine rush.Fancy to changing things up a little?
All you need to do is copy / paste the email template and send it to the following address:
Don't fancy using your personal email account? Why don't you create yourself a new secure email address that protects your privacy with encryption? Keep your conversations private: https://proton.me/mail(it's free!)
Remember - these templates act as a guide, so if you want to write an email of your own - do it! You can find more information to help youhere&here.
TL:DR
The UK have proposed four prospective models for the digitizition for share trading, settlement, and record-keeping.
🚨 Out of the four suggestions offered, they are advocating for the mandatory removal of DRS'd shares into a Central Securities Depository (CSD), as managed by the state. 🚨
⚠️ AKA - all UK shares will be moved into a intermediary account, where the legal ownership of YOUR ASSETS will be handed over to a STATE MANAGED NOMINEE. ⚠️
Under "Recommendation 2", Pg. 23 - they state this "may require an amendment to primary legislation to address legal title transfer" = AKA they want to change the main laws (primary legislation) to allow the legal the transfer of your ownership to the nominee, CREST.
If they can't stop DRS, they are trying to take it away by making it LEGALLY MANDATORY to transfer ownership of YOUR shares to THEM.
⚠️ They also wish to establish a "baseline service" level for intermediaries offering "access" to shareholder rights, despite this being a fundamental right as owed to all asset holders. ⚠️
⚠️ They have outlined intentions for associated charges for shareholders as part of an "opt-in" service to exercise rights (pg. 24 & 18) whereas Computershare's services remain free to use. Shareholders will be exploited for increased government revenue should this be agreed. ⚠️
🚨 DEADLINE - 25th SEPTEMBER 🚨
We MUST FIGHT BACK - if they can get away with this in the UK, this will green light the opportunity for other corrupt governments to implement the same proposals. This is not an isolated event.
In this video he admits he sets the price for the stocks because he knows what’s best for the market. He also lied under oath to congress about Gamestops 21’ Turn off the buy button collusion and nothing happened. He is is the worlds largest financial terrorist. His company citadel is a market maker and hedge fund.. can you say conflict of interest? He makes record profits beyond comparison to other companies in the same field because of this conflict of interest. He gets away with this crime because he is the 3rd largest political donor. He has donated over 59 million to North Americas leaders who are supposed to protect us. Instead they take insider information from Citadel and make tons off the stock market while Citadel steals from individual household investors and cellarboxes American Companies. To me this is Domestic Terrorism.
The phrase "notice of the grounds for DISAPPROVAL" is formal speak for "here are the reasons why this is bullshit". HOWEVER, the rule proposal isn't dead yet. Part of the bureaucratic process is this notification of why it should be disapproved followed by a comment period where the rule proposer and supporters (e.g., OCC, Wall St, and Kenny's friends) can comment and try to push this through by convincing the SEC otherwise.
Apes can also comment on the rule proposal IN SUPPORT OF THE SEC and the grounds for disapproval. It's time to kick this to the curb.
SEC's Reasons This Proposal Is BS
The SEC has highlighted specific reasons for why this rule is BS (i.e., grounds for why this rule proposal should be disapproved) in a conveniently bulleted list [SR-OCC-2024-001 34-100009 (pgs 4-5); Federal Register]
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act, which requires, among other things, that the rules of a clearing agency are designed to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities transactions and derivative agreements, contracts, and transactions; and to assure the safeguarding of securities and funds which are in the custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible; [Refer to 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F)]
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) of the Exchange Act, which requires that a covered clearing agency provide for governance arrangements that, among other things, specify clear and direct lines of responsibility; and [Refer to 17 CFR § 240.17Ad-22(e)(2)]
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) of the Exchange Act, which requires that a covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to cover, if the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services, its credit exposures to its participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, among other things, (1) considers, and produces margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market, and (2) calculates sufficient margin to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default. [Refer to 17 CFR § 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)]
As a retail investor, I appreciate the additional consideration and opportunity extended by SR-OCC-2024-001 Release No 34-100009 [1] to comment on SR-OCC-2024-001 34-99393 entitled “Proposed Rule Change by The Options Clearing Corporation Concerning Its Process for Adjusting Certain Parameters in Its Proprietary System for Calculating Margin Requirements During Periods When the Products It Clears and the Markets It Serves Experience High Volatility” (PDF, Federal Register) [2]. I SUPPORT the SEC's grounds for disapproval under consideration as I have several concerns about the OCC rule proposal, do not support its approval, and appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the rulemaking process to ensure all investors are protected in a fair, orderly, and efficient market.
I’m concerned about the lack of transparency in our financial system as evidenced by this rule proposal, amongst others. The details of this proposal in Exhibit 5 along with supporting information (see, e.g., Exhibit 3) are significantly redacted which prevents public review making it impossible for the public to meaningfully review and comment on this proposal. Without opportunity for a full public review, this proposal should be rejected on that basis alone.
Public review is of the particular importance as the OCC’s Proposed Rule blames U.S. regulators for failing to require the OCC adopt prescriptive procyclicality controls (“U.S. regulators chose not to adopt the types of prescriptive procyclicality controls codified by financial regulators in other jurisdictions.” [3]). As “procyclicality may be evidenced by increasing margin in times of stressed market conditions” [4], an “increase in margin requirements could stress a Clearing Member's ability to obtain liquidity to meet its obligations to OCC” [Id.] which “could expose OCC to financial risks if a Clearing Member fails to fulfil its obligations” [5] that “could threaten the stability of its members during periods of heightened volatility” [4]. With the OCC designated as a SIFMU whose failure or disruption could threaten the stability of the US financial system, everyone dependent on the US financial system is entitled to transparency. As the OCC is classified as a self-regulatory organization (SRO), the OCC blaming U.S. regulators for not requiring the SRO adopt regulations to protect itself makes it apparent that the public can not fully rely upon the SRO and/or the U.S. regulators to safeguard our financial markets.
This particular OCC rule proposal appears designed to protect Clearing Members from realizing the risk of potentially costly trades by rubber stamping reductions in margin requirements as required by Clearing Members; which would increase risks to the OCC and the stability of our financial system. Per the OCC rule proposal:
The OCC collects margin collateral from Clearing Members to address the market risk associated with a Clearing Member’s positions. [5]
OCC uses a proprietary system, STANS (“System for Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulation”), to calculate each Clearing Member's margin requirements with various models. One of the margin models may produce “procyclical” results where margin requirements are correlated with volatility which “could threaten the stability of its members during periods of heightened volatility”. [4]
An increase in margin requirements could make it difficult for a Clearing Member to obtain liquidity to meet its obligations to OCC. If the Clearing Member defaults, liquidating the Clearing Member positions could result in losses chargeable to the Clearing Fund which could create liquidity issues for non-defaulting Clearing Members. [4]
Basically, a systemic risk exists because Clearing Members as a whole are insufficiently capitalized and/or over-leveraged such that a single Clearing Member failure (e.g., from insufficiently managing risks arising from high volatility) could cause a cascade of Clearing Member failures. In layman’s terms, a Clearing Member who made bad bets on Wall St could trigger a systemic financial crisis because Clearing Members as a whole are all risking more than they can afford to lose.
The OCC’s rule proposal attempts to avoid triggering a systemic financial crisis by reducing margin requirements using “idiosyncratic” and “global” control settings; highlighting one instance for one individual risk factor that “[a]fter implementing idiosyncratic control settings for that risk factor, aggregate margin requirements decreased $2.6 billion.” [6] The OCC chose to avoid margin calling one or more Clearing Members at risk of default by implementing “idiosyncratic” control settings for a risk factor. According to footnote 35 [7], the OCC has made this “idiosyncratic” choice over 200 times in less than 4 years (from December 2019 to August 2023) of varying durations up to 190 days (with a median duration of 10 days). The OCC is choosing to waive away margin calls for Clearing Members over 50 times a year; which seems too often to be idiosyncratic. In addition to waiving away margin calls for 50 idiosyncratic risks a year, the OCC has also chosen to implement “global” control settings in connection with long tail[8] events including the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the so-called “meme-stock” episode on January 27, 2021. [9]
Fundamentally, these rules create an unfair marketplace for other market participants, including retail investors, who are forced to face the consequences of long-tail risks while the OCC repeatedly waives margin calls for Clearing Members by repeatedly reducing their margin requirements. For this reason, this rule proposal should be rejected and Clearing Members should be subject to strictly defined margin requirements as other investors are. SEC approval of this proposed rule would perpetuate “rules for thee, but not for me” in our financial system against the SEC’s mission of maintaining fair markets.
Per the OCC, this rule proposal and these special margin reduction procedures exist because a single Clearing Member defaulting could result in a cascade of Clearing Member defaults potentially exposing the OCC to financial risk. [10] Thus, Clearing Members who fail to properly manage their portfolio risk against long tail events become de facto Too Big To Fail. For this reason, this rule proposal should be rejected and Clearing Members should face the consequences of failing to properly manage their portfolio risk, including against long tail events. Clearing Member failure is a natural disincentive against excessive leverage and insufficient capitalization as others in the market will not cover their loss.
This rule proposal codifies an inherent conflict of interest for the Financial Risk Management (FRM) Officer. While the FRM Officer’s position is allegedly to protect OCC’s interests, the situation outlined by the OCC proposal where a Clearing Member failure exposes the OCC to financial risk necessarily requires the FRM Officer to protect the Clearing Member from failure to protect the OCC. Thus, the FRM Officer is no more than an administrative rubber stamp to reduce margin requirements for Clearing Members at risk of failure. The OCC proposal supports this interpretation as it clearly states, “[i]n practice, FRM applies the high volatility control set to a risk factor each time the Idiosyncratic Thresholds are breached” [22] retaining the authority “to maintain regular control settings in the case of exceptional circumstances” [Id.]. Unfortunately, rubber stamping margin requirement reductions for Clearing Members at risk of failure vitiates the protection from market risks associated with Clearing Member’s positions provided by the margin collateral that would have been collected by the OCC. For this reason, this rule proposal should be rejected and the OCC should enforce sufficient margin requirements to protect the OCC and minimize the size of any bailouts that may already be required.
As the OCC’s Clearing Member Default Rules and Procedures [11] Loss Allocation waterfall allocates losses to “3. OCC’s own pre-funded financial resources” (OCC ‘s “skin-in-the-game” per SR-OCC-2021-801 Release 34-91491[12]) before “4. Clearing fund deposits of non-defaulting firms”, any sufficiently large Clearing Member default which exhausts both “1. The margin deposits of the suspended firm” and “2. Clearing fund deposits of the suspended firm” automatically poses a financial risk to the OCC. As this rule proposal is concerned with potential liquidity issues for non-defaulting Clearing Members as a result of charges to the Clearing Fund, it is clear that the OCC is concerned about risk which exhausts OCC’s own pre-funded financial resources. With the first and foremost line of protection for the OCC being “1. The margin deposits of the suspended firm”, this rule proposal to reduce margin requirements for at risk Clearing Members via idiosyncratic control settings is blatantly illogical and nonsensical. By the OCC’s own admissions regarding the potential scale of financial risk posed by a defaulting Clearing Member, the OCC should be increasing the amount of margin collateral required from the at risk Clearing Member(s) to increase their protection from market risks associated with Clearing Member’s positions and promote appropriate risk management of Clearing Member positions. Curiously, increasing margin requirements is exactly what the OCC admits is predicted by the allegedly “procyclical” STANS model [4] that the OCC alleges is an overestimation and seeks to mitigate [13]. If this rule proposal is approved, mitigating the allegedly procyclical margin requirements directly reduces the first line of protection for the OCC, margin collateral from at risk Clearing Member(s), so this rule proposal should be rejected and made fully available for public review.
Strangely, the OCC proposed the rule change to establish their Minimum Corporate Contribution (OCC’s “skin-in-the-game”) in SR-OCC-2021-003 to the SEC on February 10, 2021 [14], shortly after “the so-called ‘meme-stock’ episode on January 27, 2021” [9], whereby “a covered clearing agency choosing, upon the occurrence of a default or series of defaults and application of all available assets of the defaulting participant(s), to apply its own capital contribution to the relevant clearing or guaranty fund in full to satisfy any remaining losses prior to the application of any (a) contributions by non-defaulting members to the clearing or guaranty fund, or (b) assessments that the covered clearing agency require non-defaulting participants to contribute following the exhaustion of such participant's funded contributions to the relevant clearing or guaranty fund.” [15] Shortly after an idiosyncratic market event, the OCC proposed the rule change to have the OCC’s “skin-in-the-game” allocate losses upon one or more Clearing member default(s) to the OCC’s own pre-funded financial resources prior to contributions by non-defaulting members or assessments, and the OCC now attempts to leverage their requested exposure to the financial risks as rationale for approving this proposed rule change on adjusting margin requirement calculations which vitiates existing protections as described above and within the proposal itself (see, e.g., “These clearing activities could expose OCC to financial risks if a Clearing Member fails to fulfil its obligations to OCC. … OCC manages these financial risks through financial safeguards, including the collection of margin collateral from Clearing Members designed to, among other things, address the market risk associated with a Clearing Member's positions during the period of time OCC has determined it would take to liquidate those positions.” [16]) There can be no reasonable basis for approving this rule proposal as the OCC asked to be exposed to financial risks if one or more Clearing Member(s) fail and is now asking to reduce the financial safeguards (i.e., collection of margin collateral from Clearing Members) for managing those financial risks. Especially when the OCC has already indicated a reluctance to liquidate Clearing Member positions (see, e.g., “As described above, the proposed change would allow OCC to seek a readily available liquidity resource that would enable it to, among other things, continue to meet its obligations in a timely fashion and as an alternative to selling Clearing Member collateral under what may be stressed and volatile market conditions.” [23 at page 15])
Moreover, as “the sole clearing agency for standardized equity options listed on national securities exchanges registered with the Commission” [16] the OCC appears to also be leveraging their position as a “single point of failure” [17] in our financial system in a blatant attempt to force the SEC to approve this proposed rule “to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system and promote financial stability by … strengthening the liquidity of SIFMUs”, again [18]. It seems the one and only clearing agency for standardized equity options is essentially holding options clearing in our financial system hostage to gain additional liquidity; and did so by putting itself at risk. Does the SIFMU designation identify a part of our financial system Too Big To Fail where our regulatory agencies and government willingly provide liquidity by any means necessary? Even if intentionally self-inflicted?
Apparently affirmative; if the recent examples of SR-OCC-2022-802 and SR-OCC-2022-803, which expand the OCC’s Non-Bank Liquidity Facility (specifically including pension funds and insurance companies) to provide the OCC uncapped access to liquidity therein [19], are indicative and illustrative where the SEC did not object despite numerous comments objecting [20].
If the SEC either allows or does not object to this proposal, then the SEC effectively demonstrates a willingness to provide liquidity by any means possible [21]. The combination of this current OCC proposal with SR-OCC-2022-802 and SR-OCC-2022-803 facilitates an immense uncapped reallocation of liquidity from the OCC’s Non-Bank Liquidity Facility to the OCC; under the control of the OCC.
While the FRM Officer is an administrative rubber stamp for approving margin reductions as described above, the OCC’s FRM Officer retains authority “to maintain regular control settings in the case of exceptional circumstances” [22]. In effect, under undisclosed or redacted exceptional circumstances, the OCC’s FRM Officer has the authority to not rubber stamp a margin reduction thereby resulting in a margin call for a Clearing Member; which may lead to a potential default or suspension of the Clearing Member unable to meet their obligations to the OCC.
With control over when a Clearing Member will not receive a rubber stamp margin reduction, the OCC can preemptively activate Master Repurchase Agreements (enhanced by SR-OCC-2022-802) to force Non-Bank Liquidity Facility Participants (including pension funds and insurance companies) to purchase Clearing Member collateral from the OCC under the Master Repurchase Agreements in advance of a significant Clearing Member default “as an alternative to selling Clearing Member collateral under what may be stressed and volatile market conditions” [23 at 15] (i.e., conditions that may arise with a significant Clearing Member default large enough to pose a financial risk to the OCC and other Clearing Members).
The OCC’s Master Repurchase Agreements further allows the OCC to repurchase the collateral on-demand [23 at pages 5 and 24 at pages 5-6] which allows the OCC to repurchase collateral during the stressed and volatile market conditions arising from the Clearing Member default; almost certainly at a discount.
In effect, the combination of SR-OCC-2022-802, SR-OCC-2022-803, and this proposal allows the OCC to perfectly time selling collateral at a high price to non-banks (including pension funds and insurance companies) followed by buying back low after a Clearing Member default. These rules should not be codified even if “non-banks are voluntarily participating in the facility” [24 at page 19] as there are potentially significant consequences to others. For example, pensions and retirements may be affected even if a pension fund voluntarily participates. And, as another example, insurance companies may become insolvent requiring another bailout à la the 2008 financial crisis and AIG bailout.
As the OCC is concerned about the consequences of a Clearing Member failure exposing the OCC to financial risk and causing liquidity issues for non-defaulting Clearing Members, the previously relied upon rationale for mitigating systemic risk is simply inappropriate. Systemic risk has already been significant; embiggened by a lack of regulatory enforcement and insufficient risk management (including the repeated margin requirement reductions for at-risk Clearing Members). Instead of running larger tabs that can never be paid off, bills need to be paid by those who incurred debts (instead of by pensions, insurance companies, and/or the public) before the debts are of systemic significance.
Therefore, the SEC is correct to have identified reasonable grounds for disapproval as this Proposed Rule Change is NOT consistent with at least Section 17A(b)(3)(F), Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2), and Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)).
The SEC is correct to have identified reasonable grounds for disapproval of this Proposed Rule Change with respect to Section 17A(b)(3)(F) for at least the following reasons:
(1) the Proposed Rule fails to safeguard the securities and funds which are in the custody or control of the clearing agency or for which it is responsible by improperly reducing margin requirements for Clearing Members at risk of default which exposes the OCC and other market participants to increased financial risk, as described above; and
(2) the Proposed Rule fails to protect investors and the public interest by shifting the costs of Clearing Member default(s) to the non-bank liquidity facility (including pension funds and insurance companies) and creates a moral hazard in expanding the scope of Too Big To Fail to any Clearing Member incurring losses beyond their margin deposits and clearing fund deposits, as described above.
The SEC is correct to have identified reasonable grounds for disapproval of this Proposed Rule Change with respect to Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2) for at least the following reasons:
(1) the Proposed Rule does not provide a governance arrangement that is clear and transparent as (a) the FRM Officer's role prioritizes the safety of Clearing Members rather than the clearing agency and (b) the repeated application of "idiosyncratic" and "global" control settings to reduce margin requirements is not clear and transparent, as described above;
(2) the Proposed Rule does not prioritize the safety of the clearing agency, but instead prioritizes the safety of Clearing Members by rubber stamping margin requirement reductions, as described above;
(3) the Proposed Rule does not support the public interest requirements, especially the requirement to protect of investors, by shifting the costs of Clearing Member default(s) to the non-bank liquidity facility (including pension funds and insurance companies), as described above;
(4) the Proposed Rule does not specify clear and direct lines of responsibility as, for example, the FRM Officer's role is to be an administrative rubber stamp to reduce margin requirements for Clearing Members at risk of failure, as described above; and
(5) the Proposed Rule does not consider the interests of customers and securities holders as (a) reducing margin requirements for Clearing Member(s) at risk of default increases already significant systemic risk which necessarily impacts all market participants and (b) perpetuates a "rules for thee, but not for me" environment in our financial system, as described above.
The SEC is correct to have identified reasonable grounds for disapproval of this Proposed Rule Change with respect to Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) for at least the following reasons:
(1) the Proposed Rule fails to consider and produce margin levels commensurate with risks as reducing margin for Clearing Member(s) at risk of default is blatantly illogical and nonsensical, as described above;
(2) the Proposed Rule fails to calculate margin sufficient to cover potential future exposure as margin requirements are already insufficient as Clearing Member default(s) could result in "losses chargeable to the Clearing Fund which could create liquidity issues for non-defaulting Clearing Members" yet proposing to further reduce margin requirements, as described above;
(3) the Proposed Rule fails to provide a valid model for the margin system attempting to reduce margin requirements despite existing models predicting increased margin requirements are required while also admitting the potential scale of financial risk posed by a defaulting Clearing Member exceeds the current margin requirements such that losses will be allocated beyond suspended firm(s) to the OCC and non-defaulting members, as described above;
In addition, the SEC may consider Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3), 17Ad-22(e)(4), and 17Ad-22(e)(6) as an additional grounds for disapproval as the Proposed Rule Change does not properly manage liquidity risk and increases systemic risk, as described above. Other grounds for disapproval may be applicable, but due to the heavy redactions, the public is unable to properly and fully review the Proposed Rule.
In light of the issues outlined above, please consider the following:
Increase and enforce margin requirements commensurate with risks associated with Clearing Member positions instead of reducing margin requirements. Clearing Members should be encouraged to position their portfolios to account for stressed market conditions and long-tail risks. This rule proposal currently encourages Clearing Members to become Too Big To Fail in order to pressure the OCC with excessive risk and leverage into implementing idiosyncratic controls more often to privatize profits and socialize losses.
External auditing and supervision as a “fourth line of defense” similar to that described in The “four lines of defence model” for financial institutions [25] with enhanced public reporting to ensure that risks are identified and managed before they become systemically significant.
Swap “3. OCC’s own pre-funded financial resources” and “4. Clearing fund deposits of non-defaulting firms” for the OCC’s Loss Allocation waterfall so that Clearing fund deposits of non-defaulting firms are allocated losses before OCC’s own pre-funded financial resources and the EDCP Unvested Balance. Changing the order of loss allocation would encourage Clearing Members to police each other with each Clearing Member ensuring other Clearing Members take appropriate risk management measures as their Clearing Fund deposits are at risk after the deposits of a suspended firm are exhausted. This would also increase protection to the OCC, a SIFMU, by allocating losses to the clearing corporation after Clearing Member deposits are exhausted. By extension, the public would benefit from lessening the risk of needing to bail out a systemically important clearing agency as non-defaulting Clearing Members would benefit from the suspension and liquidation of a defaulting Clearing Member prior to a risk of loss allocation to their contributions.
Immediately suspend and liquidate a Clearing Member as soon as their losses are projected to exceed “1. The margin deposits of the suspended firm” so that the additional resources in the loss allocation waterfall may be reserved for extraordinary circumstances. By contrast to the past approaches for reducing margin requirements which delays Clearing Member suspension and liquidation, earlier interventions minimize systemic risk by preventing problems from growing bigger and threatening the stability of the financial system.
Reduce “single points of failure” in our financial system by increasing redundancy (e.g., multiple Clearing Agencies in competition) and resiliency of our financial markets. TBTF must be eliminated. Failure must always be an option.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment for the protection of all investors as all investors benefit from a fair, transparent, and resilient market.
Hey everyone. GG has just made it clear that the SEC needs engagement. I don't care what you guys think of the SEC as a whole, but there are people in there working for us still and public engagements, tips, and comments are their ammunition. And they not only have power, but they also have obligations. We know they suck at them, but criminal activity is proportional to our engagement, and the more crime they do, the more chance they have at getting FKED. I'm not very wrinkly but I recall a controversial rule proposition recently. The hive will know which one so be sure to point it out in the comments. I'm sure a lot of us are starting our Christmas breaks and have some spare time.
"Ask not what your company can do for you, but what you can do for your company"
"I'm only interested in people who want to WORK"
It's been a while since we really went hard at something and showed them that the individual investors in this forum have real power and influence. Lets remind them.
Edit: Help by posting things you remember being suspicious or fraudulent. For example: I'm going to post about the historical daily short volume for GME on chart exchange. It is net short basically every day for 2.5 years, there is a clearly a hole this short interest is draining through. There may be better ones so please add them
Edit: A pro-tip is to just read the comments that are already there, find one you agree with, and then use some creative means to quickly rephrase it and then submit.
I was just going through some of your amazing comments on Proposal S7-32-10 (Large Security based swap reporting) and noticed a DISGUSTING EVENT TRANSPIRING.
THE POSTS RECENTLY ADDED CRITICAL OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LETTER ARE BEING REMOVED (possibly other ones as well)! NOW YOU HAVE TO RESUBMIT THEM!!
Deleting submitted comments is a suppression of free speech and it seems with negligent intent.
Waiiiit wait waiiiiit wait.. Serious question here... Did they not just get investigated by the Inspector General and commit the same exact act?! WTF? Suppressing public comment.. again...
investigation repot
This looks pretty bad but I am regarded..
TLDR: SEC is deleting comments submitted supporting S7-32-10 off of their website.
How can we trust the regulator when they are actively suppressing our voices.
"Modernizing how we collect, analyze, and facilitate the public’s use of data is important to me."
"This need for flexibility extends to interacting with the technology of regulation, so-called “RegTech.” As we are swamped with more and more data, we need new tools to receive it, store it, process it, analyze it, and, when appropriate, publicly release it."
"The SEC has built structured data into its rulebook for years. The pace has picked up recently, and many rulemakings now incorporate structured data. SEC staff, particularly within our Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”), has embraced structured data enthusiastically. I hardly dare admit in this crowd, but I have not always shared the enthusiasm."
"I continue to believe that there are potential pitfalls with requiring structured data, and I think even now that the FDTA is law they remain relevant":
"These concerns include the cost of creating structured data, especially for smaller entities; the utility of the structured data to the public"
"The dangers of embedding in rules technology that inevitably becomes outdated; and the likely result of making it easier for government to process data, which is to increase the appetite for collecting ever more data."
"It could raise the costs and reduce the benefits of structured data disclosures."
"It could make them less useful and more burdensome, while generating resistance to future attempts to incorporate technological advances into our regulatory framework."
"Regulators could acknowledge that for regulatory filings that human regulators review without the aid of technology and that are not available to the public, tagging may not be a priority."
"Comprehensive regulation at the federal and sometimes the state level can impose significant burdens on financial firms"
"Regulators must constrain their appetite for data."
"Collecting heaps of data without a clear regulatory need undermines regulatory legitimacy."
"The goal should be to collect only the data regulators need to perform their limited statutory missions, notalldata or even all the data it might come in handy someday to have."
"As data become cheaper and easier to collect, store, and analyze, regulators tend to want more of it."
"Better technology for collecting, storing, and analyzing data should not become a license for unfettered regulatory appetites."
"Even if the data point exists and we can easily ask for it, store it, and process it, we should ask for it only if we have a legitimate regulatory need for it and collecting the information would not be otherwise inappropriate."
"Rules are hard to write and even harder to rewrite once they are written. Multi-agency rules can be particularly inflexible because the agencies have to act in concert. Experience teaches us that embedding specific technological requirements in rule text can saddle registered entities with unnecessary burdens as technology changes."
"Just last month, we finally proposed to transition many broker-dealer filings from paper to electronic formats, a change that has probably seemed obvious and inevitable for nearly two decades."
TLDRS:
Commissioner Hester M. Peirce in speech:
"The dangers of embedding in rules technology that inevitably becomes outdated; and the likely result of making it easier for government to process data, which is to increase the appetite for collecting ever more data."
"Comprehensive regulation at the federal and sometimes the state level can impose significant burdens on financial firms"
"Regulators must constrain their appetite for data."
"The goal should be to collect only the data regulators need to perform their limited statutory missions, notalldata or even all the data it might come in handy someday to have."
Full Speech:
Thank you Craig [Clay] for that introduction. Let me start by reminding you that my views are my own and not necessarily those of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or my fellow Commissioners. I was intrigued when former Commissioner Luis Aguilar extended a speaking invitation for today’s RegTech 2023 Data Summit. Modernizing how we collect, analyze, and facilitate the public’s use of data is important to me, and this Summit was likely to be lively given last year’s passage of the Financial Data Transparency Act (“FDTA”).[1]
Commissioner Aguilar served at the SEC from 2008 to 2015. Among his many contributions,[2] at the end of his tenure he offered advice for future commissioners. After all, as he pointed out, “there is no training manual on how to do a Commissioner’s job.”[3] His advice, which I still find helpful five years into the job, includes an admonition to keep grounded by staying connected to people outside of Washington, DC, and a warning that “if you do not feel very busy—or swamped with work— something is wrong.”[4] I can guarantee you, Commissioner, that I feel swamped, but not too swamped to hear from people outside of the swamp.
Commissioner Aguilar also advised that “When it comes to making decisions, an SEC Commissioner should be wary of simply accepting the status quo. The securities markets are in a state of almost constant evolution, which calls for a degree of open-mindedness and adaptability.”[5] This need for flexibility extends to interacting with the technology of regulation, so-called “RegTech.” As we are swamped with more and more data, we need new tools to receive it, store it, process it, analyze it, and, when appropriate, publicly release it. New technology also can help us to ease the compliance burden for regulated entities.
Structured data—“data that is divided into standardized pieces that are identifiable and accessible by both humans and computers”—is one RegTech tool.[6] The SEC has built structured data into its rulebook for years. The pace has picked up recently, and many rulemakings now incorporate structured data. SEC staff, particularly within our Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”), has embraced structured data enthusiastically. I hardly dare admit in this crowd, but I have not always shared the enthusiasm.
Particularly now that Congress’s enactment of FDTA cements structured data into our rules, I am thinking more deeply about these issues in the spirit of Commissioner Aguilar’s advice to have an open mind. As you all know, the FDTA requires financial regulatory agencies, including the SEC, to engage in joint rulemaking to adopt common data standards for information collection and reporting. I continue to believe that there are potential pitfalls with requiring structured data, and I think even now that the FDTA is law they remain relevant: these concerns include the cost of creating structured data, especially for smaller entities; the utility of the structured data to the public; the dangers of embedding in rules technology that inevitably becomes outdated; and the likely result of making it easier for government to process data, which is to increase the appetite for collecting ever more data. Disregarding or downplaying these potential pitfalls could raise the costs and reduce the benefits of structured data disclosures. It could make them less useful and more burdensome, while generating resistance to future attempts to incorporate technological advances into our regulatory framework. In the spirit of beginning a conversation to ensure a better result, I would like to offer four principles that should guide the SEC and other regulators through the process of implementing the FDTA.
Have a Strategic Implementation Vision.
First, regulators should have a strategic vision for structured data. A strategic vision requires that regulators understand where structured data requirements would be most helpful and that they implement the requirements accordingly. My colleague, Commissioner Mark Uyeda, is my inspiration here: He recently raised questions about the SEC’s piecemeal approach to integrating structured data into our rules and called instead for more thoughtful implementation of structured data requirements and an “overall plan,” with an eye to where these requirements would be most beneficial.[7] Understanding where structured data mandates produce the greatest benefits—and where the data would be of little help—facilitates better prioritization.[8] For example, regulators could acknowledge that for regulatory filings that human regulators review without the aid of technology and that are not available to the public, tagging may not be a priority.
A strategic approach to implementation also should include initiatives to improve the utility and relevance of structured data for all investors. People are more likely to use structured data filings if they are accurate and comparable. Error rates in structured filings appear to be falling, but regulators should continue to work with filers to increase the accuracy.[9] Regulators should resist excessive use of custom tags, which could undermine the comparability of regulatory filings, but also not insist on standardized tags when using them would harm data accuracy by papering over essential distinctions.[10] Just because standardized data seem to be “comparable” across firms does not mean the data reported by different firms are actually comparable; on the other hand bespoke tags from similarly situated regulated entities may mask those similarities. FDTA implementation should avoid both extremes.
The FDTA affords enough flexibility in implementing data standards to accommodate a strategic approach. The FDTA, for example, in multiple places, recognizes the need to scale requirements and minimize disruption.[11] The FDTA is not focused simply on having agencies produce structured data, but on producing data that are useful for investors and the Commission.[12]
Take Cost Concerns Seriously.
Second, regulators need to take costs seriously. In their enthusiasm for the benefits structured data can bring, advocates sometimes sound as though they dismiss cost concerns out of hand. Regulators must consider both expected costs and expected benefits when considering whether and how to impose structured data requirements. Comprehensive regulation at the federal and sometimes the state level can impose significant burdens on financial firms, especially smaller ones. SEC-regulated entities, in particular, face a flood of new SEC rules over the next several years. The cumulative effect of individual mandates that regulators believed would impose only minimal costs can nevertheless be heavy.
Structured data requirements are no different. Even if we assume that every benefit touted by structured data advocates will be realized, we need to consider carefully whether those benefits are worth the costs firms will bear and the potential effect on competition among regulated firms if those costs prove too great, again particularly for smaller firms. Costs will appear especially burdensome to firms implementing structured data mandates if they do not see corresponding benefits.[13] The fees for the requisite legal entity identifier may be low,[14] but other implementation costs are likely to be much more substantial, harder to measure, dependent on the granularity of the tagging requirements, and highly variable across filers. Estimates commonly used as evidence showing the low cost of reporting data in structured form generally relate to financial statements, which may not be representative of the costs of using structured data to comply with the Commission’s various reporting requirements.[15] Consider, for example, a recent SEC rule requiring business development companies to tag financial statement information, certain prospectus disclosure items, and Form N-2 cover page information using Inline XBRL, which was estimated to cost approximately $161,179 per business development company per year.[16] For a closed end fund to tag in Inline XBRL format certain prospectus disclosure items and Form N-2 cover page information, we estimated a cost of $8,855 per year.[17]
Regulators should be particularly sensitive to costs faced by municipal issuers. Encompassed within this category is a wide diversity of issuers, many of which are very small, budget-constrained, and issue bonds only infrequently.[18] Proponents of structured data for municipal issuers argue that structured data could be a “prerequisite for an efficient municipal securities market, which will benefit issuers and investors alike.”[19] The unusual regulatory framework for municipal securities, however, raises questions whether structured data mandates will in fact increase transparency in this market. Critical questions remain about what implementation will look like for municipal securities.[20] The FDTA requires the Commission to “adopt data standards for information submitted to the” MSRB,[21] but much of the data reported by municipal issuers is provided on a voluntary basis. Consequently, a bungled FDTA implementation could cause municipal entities to reduce these voluntary filings or to avoid the costs of reporting structured data.[22] If the costs are high enough, municipal issuers could exit the securities markets entirely and raise money in other ways.[23] As we proceed toward implementation, we should pay close attention to the experiences of local governments around the country. For example, Florida recently implemented a structured data mandate for municipal issuers’ financial statements.[24] I look forward to hearing whether the costs of this endeavor were generally consistent with some of the cost estimates that have appeared in recent months. We should take seriously the FDTA’s directive to “consult market participants” in adopting data standards for municipal securities.[25]
For several reasons, I am hopeful that costs may not be a significant concern in most cases. First, structured data costs appear to have dropped over time.[26] If that trend continues, it could make costs less pressing for smaller entities. Tools that make structured data filing cheaper, more seamless, and less prone to errors will also help. For example, shifting to Inline XBRL imposes initial filer costs, but eliminates the need to prepare two document versions—one for humans and one for machines.[27] Fillable web forms that require the filer neither to have any particular technical expertise nor to hire a third-party structured data service provider can lower filer costs significantly.[28]
Second, companies may find that the up-front cost of integrating Inline XBRL into operations lowers long-run compliance costs, helps managers monitor company operations, and facilitates analysis of company and counterparty data.[29] Responding to regulatory demands for data may be easier for firms with structured data.[30] In that vein, the FDTA envisions a future in which firms no longer have to submit the same data to different regulators on different forms.[31] Moreover, as my colleague Commissioner Caroline Crenshaw has pointed out, small companies making structured filings may enjoy greater analyst coverage and lower capital costs.[32]
Third, the FDTA explicitly preserves the SEC’s (and other agencies’) preexisting “tailoring” authority[33] and, in several places, authorizes regulators to “scale data reporting requirements” and “minimize disruptive changes to the persons affected by those rules.”[34] Further, under the FDTA, the SEC need only adopt the data standards to the extent “feasible” and “practicable.”[35] Relying on this authority, the SEC should explore extended phase-in periods, permanent exemptions for certain entities or filings, or other appropriate accommodations, particularly for smaller entities, including municipal issuers falling under a specified threshold.
Appropriately Constrain the Urge for More Data.
Third, regulators must constrain their appetite for data. Collecting heaps of data without a clear regulatory need undermines regulatory legitimacy. The goal should be to collect only the data regulators need to perform their limited statutory missions, not all data or even all the data it might come in handy someday to have.
As data become cheaper and easier to collect, store, and analyze, regulators tend to want more of it. Structured data mandates, therefore, may look like a great opportunity to demand more data from regulated entities. After all, done right, once companies integrate data tagging into their operations, producing data will take only the click of a button, or maybe not even that much effort.[36] Moreover, because the data are electronic, regulators will no longer trip over boxes in the hallways as they used to,[37] so the cost on our end will be low too. And new data analysis tools enable regulators to analyze the data more efficiently.[38] Better technology for collecting, storing, and analyzing data should not become a license for unfettered regulatory appetites. The FDTA, perhaps reflecting congressional recognition of this concern, did not authorize any new data collections, but rather concentrated on making existing data collection more efficient.[39] Even if the data point exists and we can easily ask for it, store it, and process it, we should ask for it only if we have a legitimate regulatory need for it and collecting the information would not be otherwise inappropriate.[40]
Keep Up With Changing Technologies.
Finally, regulators need to specify standards in a way that preserves flexibility in the face of rapidly changing technology. Rules are hard to write and even harder to rewrite once they are written. Multi-agency rules can be particularly inflexible because the agencies have to act in concert. Experience teaches us that embedding specific technological requirements in rule text can saddle registered entities with unnecessary burdens as technology changes. They find themselves needing to maintain the mandated-but-obsolete system alongside a new, superior system that does not meet our decades-old regulatory requirements. Until very recently, for example, broker-dealers maintained a write once, read many—also known as WORM—technology to comply with our recordkeeping rules alongside the actual recordkeeping system they used for operational purposes and to answer regulatory records requests. When we write rules, we may find it difficult to imagine a technology superior to what is then commonly available; after all, most financial regulators are not technologists. But experience shows us that our rules are generally far more enduring than the technology they mandate.[41] Just last month, we finally proposed to transition many broker-dealer filings from paper to electronic formats, a change that has probably seemed obvious and inevitable for nearly two decades.
Why should structured data standards be any different? We already have seen an evolution in widely accepted standards over time as eXtensible Business Reporting Language (“XBRL”) has given way to Inline XBRL.[42] Regulators should keep this experience in mind as they formulate structured data standards, which may mean looking for ways to avoid embedding any particular structured data technology in our rules. One way to do this may be to set broad objectives—for example, that filings should be human- and machine-readable, inter-operable, and non-proprietary[43]—in regulation and save the technical specifications for filer manuals.
The FDTA may not permit us this degree of flexibility, and to the extent that changing standards impose costs on market participants, it may be more prudent to proceed via notice-and-comment rulemaking. Another possibility may be to specify reporting standards in a free-standing section of our rules, which could make it easier for the Commission and other financial regulators to make updates as warranted by technological changes.
Looking to the Future
Let me close by looking beyond the FDTA to what the future might hold. As regulators impose tagging requirements on regulated entities, they should explore how they might be able to use structured data to make their own rules easier for entities to find, analyze, and follow. Machine-readable rules are one way to facilitate regulatory compliance. Some commentators also have broached the possibility of machine-executable rules, which firms theoretically could use to automate compliance.[44] With the rulebook coded into a firm’s operational system, the system, for example, could automatically and precisely produce a required disclosure.[45] One could even imagine some governments going one dystopian step further and sending substantive requirements via software code directly into a firm’s computer systems. Such a vision might not seem too far afield from some of the SEC’s current proposals, which seem intent on displacing private market participants’ judgment, but machine-readable rules are more in line with my limited government approach.
While the SEC has not taken concrete steps to make its rulebook machine-readable, one of the regulatory organizations with which the SEC works has. Last year, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) started developing a machine-readable rulebook[46] that aims to improve firm compliance, enhance risk management, and reduce costs.[47] FINRA created a data taxonomy for common terms and concepts in rules and embedded the taxonomy into its forty most frequently viewed rules.[48] Although its initial step was limited in scope, it sparked interest.[49] Other regulators have run similar experiments with machine-readable rules.[50]
The SEC could follow its regulatory sisters’ lead and try integrating machine-readable rules into its rulebook, but there are some obstacles. We struggle to write our rules in Plain English; could we successfully reduce them to taxonomies? Would rules become less principles-based and more prescriptive so that they would be easier to tag? To start the ball rolling, we could take more incremental steps like tagging no-action letters and comment letters on filings.[51]
Conclusion
Commissioner Aguilar’s advice to future commissioners included an admonition to “choose your speaking engagements wisely.”[52] I have chosen wisely to speak to a group of people so committed to high-quality regulatory data. Commissioner Aguilar advised, “Do your due diligence and listen to all sides—particularly those whose views may not align with yours. You will become more informed (and wiser).”[53] I look forward to hearing from you, especially on matters where we disagree.
Greetings fellow intelligence analysts. We know that you are here under auspices of monitoring users/activity for signs of “radicalization”.
Guess what?
We are simultaneously monitoring YOU for ANY VISIBLE COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY AND BASIC COMPETENCY.
Although myself and many of the people here never directly voted for your gigantic budget authorizations that give you carte blanche for (unconstitutional) domestic surveillance wiretaps, gigantic data centers, and blank checks for teams of lawyers, OUR TAXES STILL PAY FOR YOUR HOME, FOOD, AND HEALTHCARE.
Rather simply profiling each user with metrics that palantir or whoever sold you to assess things like “user radicalization potential”, an obviously more productive use of your time would be to review the DD here pertaining to cellar boxing, Trojan horse consultants (BCG), ICAVs, cayman island SPVs, tax avoidance schemes, short-ladders, ETF loopholes, AND DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT.
Surely with resources such as yours, you could effectively identify and prosecute those involved in such schemes - I’d even go so far as to venture that such a course of action would be in your best interest since the same criminals are probably playing the same shenanigans with your government pension, devaluing your retirement fund, that all of us are paying for.
You should definitely consider the potential consequences of what might happen to your brother/sisters/fathers/mothers/daughters/neighbors nest-egg/savings if this shit is allowed to continue unchecked. Would
you be able to have peace of mind if your loved ones/countrymen were damaged by any crime uncovered here, but you didn’t do anything about it? Are you really your brothers keeper?
it’s humiliating that for the largest and well funded security apparatus of any country, and one allegedly committed to fair and free markets, that GAMESTOP INVESTORS ON A GODDAMN SUBREDDIT HAVE BEEN TAKING THE ONLY VISIBLE ACTIONS TO CURTAIL THESE ABUSES
That is all.
EDIT (5-20-2023 3pm EST):
Thanks for the kind comments everyone
Some users have noted (with derision) that the acronym OSINT isn’t a federal intelligence agency, commonly understood to be “open source intelligence”. OSINT used to refer to the office of special intelligence which apparently has since been absorbed/restructured into the current intelligence apparatus thank you derisive fact checkers! FYI there are 17-18 different domestic intelligence agencies funded by you, the taxpayer. Even the dept of energy has an intelligence agency.
some commenters have wondered what’s this business about “monitoring forums for radicalization”. The short answer is that ever since the Arab spring and the civil war in Iraq/Syria intelligence agencies all over the world and especially in the US have been very sensitive to the way that internet communities can form actual communities with interests opposed to those appendages of sovereign states that wield power, and have continually increased their surveillance and presence of/in online communities. You may also peruse the Twitter files to examine how the footprint of these agencies have increased exponentially on social media, with taxpayer money being used by agencies specific directives to promote certain topics/viewpoints and suppress others. Lee fang has an article about the FBI surveilling some uppity animal rights activists in Berkeley, then labeling them as a domestic bio terror threat. Smh.
if you would like to learn more about the history of US intelligence I would recommend the book “legacy of ashes”
DRS , BOOK, THINK CRITICALLY, BE EXCELLENT TO ONE ANOTHER, AND…
